FSS-DECO Seminar: The Core of Shapley-Scarf Markets with Full Preferences
Speaker: Prof. Jun ZHANG, Professor, Institute for Social and Economic Research, Nanjing Audit University, China
Date: 2 April 2026 (Thursday)
Time: 14:00-15:15
Venue: E21A-G035
Language: English
Abstract: We examine core concepts in the classical model of Shapley and Scarf (1974) under full preferences. Among the standard concepts, the strong core may be empty, whereas the nonempty weak core may be overly large and contain inefficient elements. Our main findings are: (1) The exclusion core of Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), a recent concept outperforming standard concepts in complex environments under strict preferences, can also be empty, yet it is more often nonempty than the strong core. (2) We introduce two new core concepts, respectively built on the exclusion core and the strong core. Both are nonempty and Pareto efficient, and coincide with the strong core whenever it is nonempty. (3) These core concepts are ordered by set inclusion, with the strong core as the smallest and the weak core as the largest.
