FSS-DECO seminar: Equilibrium Selection through Action Revision: Experiments

Speaker: Prof. Nilanjan ROY, Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong

Date: 05 Nov 2025 (Wednesday)

Time: 14:00-15:15

Language: English

Venue: E21B-G002

Abstract: We design an experiment to examine the effects of allowing players to revise their actions in coordination games with opposing interest. Players receive random opportunities to revise actions, with final payoffs determined by actions at the last opportunity. Our experiment encompasses a Battle-of-the-Sexes game and three variations of the inequality game. Our treatments adjust the arrival frequency of revision opportunities, which affects the equilibrium selection predictions. The results reveal higher coordination rates with action revision compared to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The findings support theoretical predictions that players with fewer revision chances are more likely to realize their preferred outcomes. Furthermore, beyond the frequency of the revision, the payoff structure emerges as a crucial factor in determining equilibrium selection.