制度與機制設計中心講座：All Pay Quality-Bids in Score Procurement Auctions
講者：呂景峰教授 / 新加坡國立大學經濟學系教授
日期：14/05/2026 (四)
時間：16:00 – 17:15
地點：E21B-G002
內容: This paper studies score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. Under the common difference-score rule, we characterize the bidding equilibrium in closed form and derive comparative statics. We then solve for the procurer-optimal score rule. With power-form costs, a higher proportion of the all-pay quality component lowers quality, total surplus, and suppliers’ payoffs, while the procurer’s payoff may rise or fall. Reimbursing losing suppliers’ all-pay components increases quality and suppliers’ payoffs but reduces total surplus and the procurer’s payoff. The optimal score rule is quasi-linear in quality and price: it weights quality less than the procurer’s payoff function and is less sensitive to marginal increases in quality. Under a weakly convex reverse hazard rate, the optimal rule values quality more when quality is costlier to provide or when more suppliers participate. Our approach extends to environments with minimum score or quality constraints, multi-dimensional quality bids, and general score rules.
