經濟學系講座: Equilibrium Selection through Action Revision: Experiments

講者: Nilanjan ROY教授/香港城市大學經濟及金融學系副教授

日期：05/11/2025 (三)

時間: 14:00-15:15

地點: English

語言: 英語

內容: We design an experiment to examine the effects of allowing players to revise their actions in coordination games with opposing interest. Players receive random opportunities to revise actions, with final payoffs determined by actions at the last opportunity. Our experiment encompasses a Battle-of-the-Sexes game and three variations of the inequality game. Our treatments adjust the arrival frequency of revision opportunities, which affects the equilibrium selection predictions. The results reveal higher coordination rates with action revision compared to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The findings support theoretical predictions that players with fewer revision chances are more likely to realize their preferred outcomes. Furthermore, beyond the frequency of the revision, the payoff structure emerges as a crucial factor in determining equilibrium selection.